06.06.09
Some General Musings
It’s been a long day and it’s late, so I probably won’t ramble too much tonight. I played 2 sessions today (I know, what else is new??), with some interesting hands both sessions. Without the hand records in front of me, I don’t have a lot of specifics, but a couple of issues worth discussing.
This afternoon, my opponents bid a vulnerable 5C in competition, and my partner, with a decent hand, doubled for penalties. Well, they made their contract. The double gave us a clear bottom board. At imps, the double would have cost us 4 imps, but at matchpoints, we went from an average to a bottom. Some people did not find game, others were in 4S making 5, and one or two others were in 5C making 5. The issue is whether partner should double. Some general information on the auction. We are vulnerable, they are not. The bidding went something like this:
Partner (South) West Me (North) East
1D 2C 3C* 4C
4D 5C Pass Pass
Dbl All pass
*Limit Raise or Better
My limit raise was questionable. It was 9 soft HCP with 6 diamonds to the QJ. No aces. My shape was 2-3-6-2, if I remember correctly. Tomorrow, I will have the hand record available and I will discuss the pitfalls of my bidding.
Anyway, partner failed to take one of the most important steps when deciding whether to double a contract, something that most players neglect to do. She failed to do a cost-benefit analysis. How much do you stand to gain by doubling and defeating the contract versus how much do you stand to lose if they make their doubled contract. In this case, it looked like the double was close, and we could beat the contract at most one trick. The opponents were not vulnerable. We might gain a few matchpoints if we beat the contract, but probably only a few matchpoints. However, if declarer makes the contract, we stand to lose a lot 4-9 matchpoints, a lot more than we stand to gain. Therefore, is it worth a tight double. Probably not. Change the scenario just a little: instead of unfavorable vulnerability (we are vulnerable, they are not), assume favorable vulnerability (we are not vul, they are). Now the cost-benefit analysis changes. We can probably make a part-score, but not game. We stand to gain a great deal by beating the contract just 1 trick – 200 versus our 130, while at unfavorable vulnerability, we look to gain 100 versus 130. Probably not worth the close double. So in the modified example, we stand to gain a great deal (probably the same 4-9 matchpoints we stand to lose against the double making). Therefore, the double would be better.
I know this makes little sense without a hand in front of you. I will post the full hand tomorrow, and we can discuss the issue further. I am simply not coherent enough at the moment to write this out properly.
Tonight was the first session of the world simultaneous pairs, always a fun event. We had 7 tables at the club. One pair did exceedingly well (as of a few minutes ago, 81 in the world). The results at our club matchpointed much better across the world than they did at the club. All 7 of our North-Souths are in the top half world-wide field. For example, we were tied for 4/5 north south at the club with under 48%. However, world-wide, we have 55.48%, so far, for #648 out of nearly 3100 pairs. All I can say is that this is a wild game.
Well, hopefully tomorrow I will be coherent and I will have my hand records so I can post some hands to discuss.
Jim Huntington said,
June 8, 2009 at 7:33 pm
Another point against the close double above – I see some pairs were in 4S making five. The unsuccessful double allowed the inferior 5C contract to leapfrog the superior (on the cards or defense) 4S one. That’s a critical factor on close doubles – how good will your score be if they make it undoubled? Pretty decent it would have been this time.
Jim Huntington said,
June 8, 2009 at 7:38 pm
And as for your concern about having “9 HCP,” why aren’t you using loser count for raises? I suspect that with six diamonds your hand got to the 8 you should have, regardless of the atrociously overemphasized HCPs.